This relationship between body and mind is what falls under the so called unanswered questions regarding the identity of sarira (body) and jiva (soul). The short answer is that Buddhism has an experiential view, as shown in the teachings on the five aggregates and six sensory domains, where physical and mental phenomena are not substantially differentiated.
"If there is the view, 'The soul and the body are the same,' there is no living of the holy life; and if there is the view, 'The soul is one thing, the body is another,' there is no living of the holy life. Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma by the middle: 'With birth as condition, aging-and-death.'"
(SN 12.35)
"Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise: 'The soul and the body are the same'?"
...
"Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise: 'The soul is one thing, the body another'?"
...
"But without clinging to what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change, could such a view as that arise?"
"No, venerable sir."
(SN 24.13, 14)
"Master Gotama, what is the cause and reason why these various speculative views arise in the world: ... 'The soul and the body are the same' or 'The soul is one thing, the body is another'..."
"It is, Vaccha, because of not knowing form/feeling/perception/volitional formations/consciousness, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation that those various speculative views arise in the world"
(SN 33.1-5)
"As to the various views that arise in the world, householder, 'The world is eternal' '" -these as well as the sixty-two speculative views mentioned in the Brahmajala: when there is identity view, these views come to be; when there is no identity view, these views do not come to be."
(SN 41.3)
"Vaccha, wanderers of other sects regard the eye thus: 'This is mine, this I am, this is my self.' They regard the ear . . . the nose . . . the tongue . . . the body . . . the mind thus: 'This is mine, this I am, this is my self.' Therefore, when the wanderers of other sects are asked such questions, they give such answers as: 'The world is eternal' . . . or 'The Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist after death.' But, Vaccha, the Tathagata, the Arahant, the Perfectly Enlightened One, regards the eye thus: 'This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.' He regards the ear . . . the mind thus: 'This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.' Therefore, when the Tathagata is asked such questions, he does not give such answers."
(SN 44.7)
"If there is the view, 'The soul and the body are the same,' there is no living of the holy life; and if there is the view, 'The soul is one thing, the body is another,' there is no living of the holy life. Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma by the middle: 'With birth as condition, aging-and-death.'"
(SN 12.35)
"Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise: 'The soul and the body are the same'?"
...
"Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise: 'The soul is one thing, the body another'?"
...
"But without clinging to what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change, could such a view as that arise?"
"No, venerable sir."
(SN 24.13, 14)
"Master Gotama, what is the cause and reason why these various speculative views arise in the world: ... 'The soul and the body are the same' or 'The soul is one thing, the body is another'..."
"It is, Vaccha, because of not knowing form/feeling/perception/volitional formations/consciousness, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation that those various speculative views arise in the world"
(SN 33.1-5)
"As to the various views that arise in the world, householder, 'The world is eternal' '" -these as well as the sixty-two speculative views mentioned in the Brahmajala: when there is identity view, these views come to be; when there is no identity view, these views do not come to be."
(SN 41.3)
"Vaccha, wanderers of other sects regard the eye thus: 'This is mine, this I am, this is my self.' They regard the ear . . . the nose . . . the tongue . . . the body . . . the mind thus: 'This is mine, this I am, this is my self.' Therefore, when the wanderers of other sects are asked such questions, they give such answers as: 'The world is eternal' . . . or 'The Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist after death.' But, Vaccha, the Tathagata, the Arahant, the Perfectly Enlightened One, regards the eye thus: 'This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.' He regards the ear . . . the mind thus: 'This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.' Therefore, when the Tathagata is asked such questions, he does not give such answers."
(SN 44.7)
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